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Abstract
In many tournaments it is the contestants themselves who deter-
mine reward allocation. Labor-union members bargain over wage dis-
tribution, and many rms allow self-managed teams to freely determine
internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and division of labour.
We analyze, and test experimentally, a rank-order tournament where
heterogenous agents determine the spread between winner prize and
looser prize. We investigate the relationship between prize spread, un-
certainty (i.e. noise between e¤ort and performance), heterogeneity
and e¤ort. The paper challenges well-known results from tournament
theory. We nd that a large prize spread is associated with low degree
of uncertainty and high degree of heterogeneity, and that heterogeneity
triggers e¤ort. By and large, our real-e¤ort experiment supports the
theoretical predictions.
1 Introduction
In many areas of economic, political and social life, "the rules of the game"
are determined by its players: Politicians determine rules of election, sports
federations determine rules for leagues and tournaments, and the allocation
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of resourses within rms and organizations is often decided by its mem-
bers/employees.
Tournament theory provides us with a potential tool for analyzing these
phenomena. The theory was rst introduced by Lazear and Rosen (1981)
as an e¤ort to understand situations where wage di¤erences are based on
relative di¤erences between the individuals rather than on marginal produc-
tivity. The theory has had enormous impact. In many settings, tournaments
are found to be at least as good as any other incentive mechanism in terms
of inducing e¤ort, 1 and comparative static results on the optimal tourna-
ment solution have provided insights into internal wage policies of rms (see
Lazear, 1995, for an overview).
So far tournament theory has not been used to analyze games where
the players set the rules. In particular, its always assumed that the spread
between winner prize and loser prize (we use the term prize spread through-
out this paper) is determined by a non-participating principal. But in many
tournaments this is not the case. Prize spread is often set by the contestants
themselves. Labor-unions determine prize spread in bargaining over the dis-
tribution of xed wage pools, and many rms allow self-managed teams to
freely determine internal resource allocation, incentive structure, and divi-
sion of labour (Osterman, 1995; and Jehn et al.,1999). One should perhaps
expect that the large literature on unions and wage bargaining has addressed
tournaments with prize-setting agents, but to our knowledge the tournament
feature of decentralized bargaining has not yet been analyzed. In this paper
we thus analyze a rank-order tournament where risk neutral heterogeneous
agents determine prize spreads.
Theoretical results: In a tournament between two risk-neutral agents that
di¤er in ability-levels, the low-ability agent (he) will always prefer zero prize
spread. For the high-ability agent (she), however, determining optimal prize
spread is not straightforward. A high prize spread is good since she expects
1By tying compensation to the agents relative performance, the principal can lter
out common noise so that compensation to the largest possible extent is based on real
e¤ort, not random shocks that are outside the agents control (see Holmström,1982; and
Mookherjee, 1984). With RPEs special form, rank-order tournaments, the agents are also
completely insulated from the risk of common negative shocks (see Lazear and Rosen, 1981;
Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz, 1983; Green and Stokey, 1983). Moreover, tournaments need only
rely on ordinal performance measures. It may thus be easier and less costly to measure
relative than absolute performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). In addition, it may be easier
for the principal to commit to tournament schemes if output is not veriable (Carmichael,
1983; Malcomson, 1984; Levin, 2002).
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to win. But it is bad since it triggers e¤ort, and e¤ort is costly. Since op-
timal prize spread for the low-ability-agent is always zero, it is su¢ cient to
characterize the high-ability agents optimal choice in order to understand
equilibrium prize spread, i.e. if the high-ability agent has some bargaining-
power, then comparative static results on her optimal prize spread hold for
the bargaining solution between the agents. We characterize the optimal
prize spread for the high-ability agent, and investigate the relationship be-
tween prize spread, uncertainty (i.e. noise between e¤ort and performance)2,
heterogeneity and e¤ort. Our results can be summarized as follows:
First, we nd that the high-ability agents optimization problem entails
corner solutions. Either she wants zero prize spread, or she wants maximal
prize spread. A marginal parameter change may thus dramatically change
prize spread and e¤ort. This is interesting since it can explain why seemingly
similar rms may di¤er substantially in wage structure and performance (see
Gibbons et al., 2007, for a discussion on persistent performance di¤erences
among seemingly similar enterprises).
Second, we nd that more heterogeneity (i.e. larger ability-di¤erence)
leads to higher equilibrium e¤ort. This is an interesting result since it chal-
lenges theory stating that heterogeneity reduces e¤ort. In Lazear and Rosen
(1981), e¤ort su¤ers from more heterogeneity, or at best is una¤ected by
ability-di¤erence if the principal can observe the agents type so that she
perfectly can compensate heterogeneity with higher prize spread. We show
that higher ability-di¤erence increases prize spread more than just to com-
pensate for heterogeneity, leading to higher equilibrium e¤ort.
Third, we nd that large prize spread is associated with low degree of
uncertainty. This contrasts with the standard tournament result where the
optimal prize spread increases with uncertainty. Our result is not triv-
ial, since there are two countervailing e¤ects: As uncertainty increases, the
probability of winning decreases cet. par. so the high-ability agent might
want to decrease prize spread in order to reduce e¤ort costs. However, the
high-ability agent can removethe reduced winner probability by increasing
the prize spread, since higher prize spread increases the e¤ort-di¤erence be-
tween the agents. We show that the former e¤ect dominates under standard
assumptions.
From an incentive perspective, the result o¤ers an alternative explana-
2We use "uncertainty" and "noise" synonymously throughout the paper.
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tion to a negative relationship between uncertainty and incentives. The
standard explanation is risk aversion; the optimal intensity of incentives is
negatively related to uncertainty when agents are risk averse. Our model
shows that tournaments with prize-setting agents can create such a relation-
ship even if agents are risk neutral.
The result also points to the issue of "desert", or whether or not perfor-
mance pay is "fair". According to Konow (2003), a common view is that
di¤erences owing to luck are unfair, and that only di¤erences attributable to
e¤ort are fair. Our high-ability agent seemingly has fairness concerns since
her preferences are aligned with the rms preferences for high prize spread
if e¤ort is important. But if luck is important, then her preferences are
aligned with the low-ability employee. However, this is not because of fair-
ness concerns; she simply makes a trade-o¤between e¤ort costs and expected
monetary payo¤. One should thus be cautious with drawing the conclusion
that employees have fairness concerns if they argue that uncertainty makes
performance pay unfair.
Experimental results: We do not explicitly deduce bargaining solutions
between low and high-ability agents, but as noted above, comparative static
results on the high-ability agents optimal prize spread should apply for the
bargaining solution between the agents. We conducted a real e¤ort experi-
ment to test this conjecture for some of our theoretical results. We elicited
subjectsrisk preferences and their ability to do head calculation, and we
then got them to bargain over winner prize and loser prize prior to two-player
tournaments in head calculation. This enabled us to test the relationship
between prize spread, ability-di¤erence and e¤ort. We also imposed two un-
certainty levels, high and low, enabling us to study the relationship between
prize spread and noise. By large, the experiment supports the theoretical
predictions. Here are the results:
First, controlling for risk preferences, we nd that prize spread signi-
cantly decreases with uncertainty, which supports the theoretical prediction.
We nd no impact from personality and gender, indicating that fairness con-
cerns do not drive our experimental results.
Second and third, we nd that prize spread signicantly increases in
the ability-di¤erence between the agents, and that e¤ort increases in prize
spread. This supports the theoretical prediction that more heterogeneity
increases prize spread, which thereby increases e¤ort. Controlling for prize
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spread, however, we nd a signicant negative relationship between ability-
di¤erence and e¤ort, supporting previous experimental results.
Related literature: As noted above, neither the tournament literature
nor the union literature have analyzed rank-order tournaments where het-
erogenous agents set prize spread.3 Brunello (1994) analyzes a case where
homogenous agents decide prize spread in a principal-agents game with a
exible wage pool; and Sutter (2006) analyzes an endogenous prize selection
tournament where the best member of a team is given a right ex post to
propose prize spread within the team. Neither of these papers analyze a sit-
uation where heterogenous contestants determine prize spread prior to the
tournament. Riis (2007) analyzes a tournament where heterogenous con-
testants can choose from a menu of prizes, but the prize menu is dened
by the principal ex ante. And while Riis focuses on how the principal can
structure the prize menu so as to implement rst-best e¤ort, we focus on
the agentsoptimal prize spread and the comparative statics that can be
derived from the agentssolution.
Several papers have experimentally tested hypotheses deduced from tour-
nament theory, starting with Bull et. al. (1987).4 Typically, these papers
test the relationship between prize spread, e¤ort and heterogeneity. But
there are only a few real e¤ort experiments testing the theory (van Dijk,
Sonneman and van Winden, 2001; Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003;
and Dohmen and Falk, 2006), and no one has examined a case where the
agents set prize spread - although Sutter (2006) runs an experiment (not real
e¤ort) where he tests his model of endogenous prize selection. Moreover, no
one has (to our knowledge) experimentally tested the relationship between
uncertainty and prize spread, not even in tournaments where the principal
sets prize spread.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
model, Section 3 outlines the experimental design, Section 4 formulates the
hypothesis to be tested, Section 5 presents results and analysis from the ex-
periment, while Section 6 concludes. Proofs and tables are in the appendix.
3Unions composed of identical members has been the basis for representations of union
preferences (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004), although Ross (1948) already 60 years ago
argued that the heterogenity of union members a¤ects its aims.
4See Harbring and Irlenbusch (2004) and Falk and Fehr (2003) for an overview of these
experiments.
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2 The model
Consider a tournament between two risk-neutral agents. The winner of the
tournament receives w1 while the loser receives w2  w1: Output yi from
agent i is given by
yi = ei + zi
where ei is e¤ort and zi is a random luck component. Expected payo¤ for
agent i is
Pw1 + (1  P )w2   Ci(ei) (1)
where Ci(ei) is the cost of e¤ort (C 0i > 0 and C
00
i > 0) and P is the
probability of winning. Let
P = prob(ei + zi > ej + zj) = prob(ei   ej > zj   zi) = G(ei   ej)
denote the probability that agent i achieves a higher output then agent j:
G(:) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable zj   zi,
where G(ei   ej) = 1  G(ej   ei). Each player chooses e¤ort to maximize
expected payo¤ (1). This gives the IC constraint (for interior solution)
(w1   w2)@P
@ei
= C 0i(ei) (2)
From Nash-assumptions it follows that each player optimizes e¤ort against
the optimal e¤ort of his opponent. Agent i thus takes agent j0s e¤ort as
given when choosing his e¤ort level, and it follows that
@P
@ei
=
@G(ei   ej)
@ei
= g(ei   ej):
where g(ei   ej) is the density function of G(ei   ej). The IC constraint is
thus
(w1   w2)g(ei   ej) = C 0i(ei) (3)
We make the common assumption that the total prize pool is xed, i.e.
that w1 + w2 = R, where R is exogenous and una¤ected by e¤ort levels,
but we discuss later how a change in R a¤ects prize spread. A xed R may
sound like a strict assumption, but in many tournaments a xed prize pool
is indeed the case. In pure promotion tournaments for example, the sum of
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prizes is una¤ected by e¤ort-levels. And in larger bureaucratic organizations,
total resource provision to organizational divisions may often be exogenously
given, or at least perceived as exogenous by the employees. Decentralized
wage bargaining is also a good example. In many countries, the size of the
wage pool that is to be allocated locally in each rm is determined by central
bargaining between labor unions and employer federations. The size of the
local wage pool is then una¤ected by total e¤ort levels, and the only thing
bargained over locally is distribution of the xed wage pool. Finally, note
that if the absolute value of output is unveriable to a third party, then
a xed prize pool may turn out optimal: With a exible prize pool, total
prize payments increase in e¤ort, making the principals incentive to renege
on payments increase in e¤ort. A xed prize pool removes this problem,
and makes it easier for the principal to commit to prize promises (see e.g.
Carmichael, 1983).
If w1 + w2 = R, then prize spread is w1   w2 = R   2w2: Agent i0s
optimal prize spread is then the solution to
max
w2
[w2 + P (R  2w2)  Ci(ei)] s.t. (3)
where (3) applies to both agents and is assumed to dene the tourna-
ment equilibrium. With identical (homogenous) agents, P = 12 in equilib-
rium, hence expected prize for each agent is 12R and does not vary with
prize spread. The agents will simply minimize costs, which is to set zero
prize spread, R   2w2 = 0, such that optimal e¤ort level is zero. This is
the collusion logic, rst thoroughly analyzed by Mookherjee (1984). When
prizes are xed, agents have incentives to collude on low e¤ort equilibria. It
follows here that if they are to decide prizes, they set them so that e¤ort is
minimized.
Heterogeneous agents: A tournament model with prize-setting agents
rst becomes interesting when we introduce heterogeneity in ability-levels.
Of course, the agents still have incentives to collude on zero prize spread
by using side payments. It is, however, a quite standard assumption in the
tournament literature to assume that collusive contracts are not enforceable.
We thus make the assumption that side payments are impossible.
We model di¤erences in ability-level by assuming that the net marginal
return from e¤ort is higher for the high-ability agent, and the standard
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assumption is then C 0i(ei) < C
0
j(ej) for all ei = ej , meaning that the marginal
cost from e¤ort is lower for the high-ability agent i. Symmetric density
function g(ej   ei) = g(ei   ej) implies that C 0i(ei) = C 0j(ej) in equilibrium,
which for interior solutions implies ej < ei and thus 12 < G(ei   ej) < 1:
With no restrictions on prize spread, a prize-setting principal can easily
achieve rst-best if ability-level is common knowledge. The problem with
heterogenous agents arises if their types cannot be identied. For prize-
setting agents, however, rst-best implementation is not the objective if the
wage pool is xed in advance. For simplicity, we thus assume that the agents
know each othersability-levels. It can easily be shown that the comparative
static results we achieve apply also when ability-level is uncertain.
From the restriction w1  w2, it is straight-forward to see that the
optimal prize spread for the low-ability agent j is zero. He has nothing
to gain from increasing prize spread, since this implies costly e¤ort and a
reduced chance of winning the tournament. Hence,
Proposition 1 If w1  w2; and C 0i(ei) < C 0j(ej) for all ei = ej, then
the low ability agent j0s optimal prize spread is zero, yielding zero e¤ort in
equilibrium.
It is less trivial to nd the optimal prize spread for the high-ability agent
i: As noted in the introduction, we assume that the parties cannot use side
payments in order to collude on low e¤ort / zero prize-spread. Taking this
into account, agent i solves
max
w2
W (w2) = [w2 +G(ei   ej)(R  2w2)  Ci(ei)] s.t. (3) (4)
where e¤ort levels ei; ej are determined as functions of w2 in the tour-
nament. Agent i will choose (R   2w2) > 0 if there exist equilibrium e¤ort
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levels ei; ej where5
G(ei   ej)(R  2w2) > Ci(ei) (5)
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the ability-di¤erence is su¢ -
ciently large such that (5) holds in equilibrium. This is not a strict assump-
tion. With Inada conditions, i.e. Cl(el), l = i; j continuously di¤erentiable
and strictly increasing in el and Cl(0) = C 0l(0) = 0, then (5) holds in equi-
librium for arbitrarily small ability di¤erences.
From (4) we have
W 0(w2) = 1  2G(ei   ej) + (R  2w2)g(ei   ej)( @ei
@w2
  @ej
@w2
)  C 0i(ei)
@ei
@w2
From the IC constraint (3) we then get
W 0(w2) = 1  2G(ei   ej)  (R  2w2)g(ei   ej) @ej
@w2
(6)
Equation (6) shows that the marginal value for agent i of increased w2
(reduced prize spread) has two components. First, for given e¤orts her
expected payment is a¤ected. This marginal payment e¤ect is 1  2G(ei  
ej) < 0, where the inequality follows from the fact that she will exert higher
equilibrium e¤ort (ei > ej) due to her ability advantage, and hence win with
a probability exceeding 1=2. Second, there is an indirect e¤ect induced by
reduced e¤ort on the part of the other agent ( @ej@w2 < 0), and this e¤ect will
increase agent is probability of winning the tournament.6 Thus, a reduced
prize spread (increased w2) yields one negative and one positive e¤ect for
agent i. We will show below that under reasonable assumptions either the
rst or the second of these e¤ects will dominate, so that the agent will then
choose either maximal spread (w2 = 0) or minimal spread (w2 = R=2).
Consider now the marginal value W 0(w2). The IC constraints dene
5Note that the tournament equilibrium underlying this analysis will exist only if the IC
conditions for the agentse¤orts reect truly optimal choices. In particular, the second-
order conditions must hold, hence we must have (R   2w2)g0(e)   C00i (ei)  0 and (R  
2w2)g
0( e)   C00j (ej)  0, where e = ei   ej . Since g0(e) < 0 for e > 0, the rst will
hold for convex costs, but the second may not, since g0( e) =  g0(e) > 0. It follows that
the level of uncertainty has to be su¢ ciently large for a tournament equilibrium to exist.
This also applies for standard tournament models where the principal sets prize spread
(see Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
6The indirect e¤ect induced by agent is own e¤ort response is zero due to the IC
constraint.
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simultaneously the two e¤ort levels as functions of w2. It is convenient
here to think of these as being dened recursively; rst ei = ei(ej) being
dened by equality of marginal costs (C 0i(ei) = C
0
j(ej)), and then ej = ej(w2)
dened by the IC condition (3) for agent j, substituting for ei = ei(ej) in
this condition. Let e = ei(ej)  ej denote the e¤ort di¤erence as a function
of agent js e¤ort ej , and let Ee(ej) denote the elasticity of this function
(Ee(ej) =
ej
e
de
dej
). The marginal value W 0(w2) in (6) can then be written in
the following form (see the appendix):
W 0(w2) = 1  2G(e)  2g(e)ej
Eg(e)Ee(ej)  EC0j (ej)
(7)
where Eg(e) =
g0(e)
g(e) e is the elasticity of the probability density, and EC0j (ej) =
C00j (ej)
C0j(ej)
ej is the elasticity of the marginal cost function for agent j.
Consider now the case of minimal wage spread, i.e. w2 = R=2. In this
case both agents will exert minimal e¤ort (ei = ej = 0), so the marginal
value W 0(w2) for w2 = R=2 is given by the expression on the RHS of (7)
calculated at e = ej = 0. If now the elasticity of agent js marginal cost
function is bounded away from zero (EC0j (0) > 0), we see that the value on
the RHS is zero, and hence that W 0(w2) = 0 for w2 = R=2. Under this mild
assumption (the elasticity is bounded away from zero for all strictly convex
power functions; see below), it is thus the case that a minimal prize spread
and hence minimal e¤ort is a candidate for an optimum.
To examine this issue we introduce further assumptions. In the following
we assume Ci(ei) = kieni and Cj(ej) = kje
n
j where n > 1 and kj > ki. Note
that the elasticity of marginal cost is then constant; EC0j (ej) = n   1 > 0.
The IC constraints imply equality of marginal costs;
nkie
n 1
i = nkje
n 1
j (8)
and the e¤ort di¤erence e is then given by:
e  ei   ej =

(
kj
ki
)
1
n 1   1

ej  1
K
ej (9)
where K =

(
kj
ki
)
1
n 1   1
 1
. This yields elasticity Ee(ej) = 1, and substi-
tuting for the other elasticities and for ej = Ke we then see that (7) here
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can be written as
W 0(w2) = 1  2G(e) K 2g(e)eg0(e)
g(e) e  (n  1)
 F^ (e), e = e(w2) (10)
where the e¤ort di¤erence as a function of w2 (e(w2)) is dened by (9) and
the IC constraints.
At an interior optimum we will have W 0(w2) = 0, and the optimal e¤ort
di¤erence e given by F^ (e) = 0. The second-order condition for an optimum
requires W 00(w2) = F^ 0(e)e0(w2)  0. From the IC constraints and (9) we
can see that e0(w2) < 0 when g0(e)  0 for e  0, which we will assume to
be the case. The SOC for an optimum thus requires F^ 0(e)  0.
Note that e = 0 is always a solution to F^ (e) = 0. We will show below
that this solution, which corresponds to minimal prize spread (w2 = R=2),
is optimal for a range of parameters, and that the other corner solution
(w2 = 0) is optimal for other parameters. Moreover, for a class of distribu-
tions including the normal and uniform ones, we will show that the optimal
solution is always a corner solution.
Assume now that the noise is of the form
zl = "l + a,  > 0 (11)
where "l has some xed distribution and ; a are constants. (This holds
e.g. for normal and uniform distributions.) Denote the CDF of "j   "i by
 (d) = Pr("j   "i < d), with density (d) =  0(d). Then we have
G(e) = Pr(zj   zi < e) = Pr("j   "i < e

) =  (
e

)
and g(e) = G0(e) = ( e )
1
 . By dening d =
e
 we have g(e)e = (d)d and
g0(e)
g(e) e =
0(d)
(d) d, and hence (10) can be written as
W 0(w2) = F (d)  1  2 (d) K 2(d)d0(d)
(d) d  (n  1)
, d =
e(w2)

(12)
We see that at an interior optimum the optimal e¤ort di¤erence e would
be given by e = d, where d is a solution to F (d) = 0. The SOC then
requires F 0(d)  0. The other possibilities are corner solutions; either w2 = 0
or w2 = R=2.
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For w2 = R=2 and thus e = e(w2) = 0, we see that W 0(w2) = F (0) = 0.
For this to be a maximum, the SOC requires F 0(0)  0. It turns out that his
condition is satised i¤K  n 1, i.e. i¤ the degree of heterogeneity is small
(kjki 

n
n 1
n 1
). In such a case, minimal e¤ort and spread (e = d = 0
and w2 = R=2) are then a local maximum.7 Moreover, this maximum is
also a global one if F (d) > 0 for 0 < d < dm = emax=, where emax is the
largest feasible e¤ort spread for the given R, i.e. the spread corresponding
to w2 = 0. We show (see appendix) that this is indeed the case if R is
su¢ ciently small and/or  is su¢ ciently large. For such parameters (R and
) it is thus overall optimal to induce minimal e¤ort and spread when the
degree of heterogeneity is small. By a similar reasoning we can also show
that for small R and/or large  it is optimal to induce maximal e¤ort spread
when the degree of heterogeneity is large. We have:
Proposition 2 (i) For low heterogeneity (kjki <

n
n 1
n 1
) we have: there
is r1 > 0 such that for R=n < r1, i.e. for R su¢ ciently small and /or 
su¢ ciently large, the optimal solution entails minimal e¤ort and minimal
prize spread; e = ei = ej = 0 and w2 = R=2. (ii) For large heterogeneity
(kjki >

n
n 1
n 1
) we have: there is r2 > 0 such that for R=n < r2 the
optimal solution entails maximal e¤ort and prize spread; e = emax and w2 =
0.
By invoking more assumptions we can be more precise:
Proposition 3 For a class of distributions including the normal and uni-
form ones the following holds. (i) For low heterogeneity (kjki <

n
n 1
n 1
) we
have: the optimal solution entails either (a) minimal e¤ort and prize spread
(e = 0 and w2 = R=2) or (b) maximal e¤ort and prize spread (e = emax and
w2 = 0). There is r1 > 0 such that the former is optimal for R=n < r1, and
the latter is optimal for R=n > r1 (provided the tournament equilibrium ex-
ists for this case). (ii) For large heterogeneity (kjki >

n
n 1
n 1
) we have:
for all parameters R;  for which the tournament equilibrium exists, the op-
timal solution entails maximal e¤ort and prize spread; e = emax and w2 = 0.
(iii) When the solution entails maximal spread we have emax = dm(R=n),
7More precisely, it is a local maximum if strict inequality K > n 1 and thus F 0(0) > 0
hold.
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where d0m() > 0. E¤ort is then increasing in R and non-monotone in 
(increasing for  small and decreasing for  large).
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition shows that the high-ability agents optimal prize spread
is high for low uncertainty (low ) and low for high uncertainty. Hence,
the standard result that prize spread increases in noise when agents are
risk neutral is not robust to a setting where heterogeneous agents deter-
mine prize spread. We also nd that prize spread and e¤ort are low for
low heterogeneity and high for high heterogeneity. This is not trivial Higher
ability-di¤erence increases the chance of winning, cet. par. This calls for
higher prize spread. But higher ability-di¤erence makes it possible for the
high-ability agent to reduce e¤ort, and thereby reduce e¤ort costs without
a¤ecting the probability of winning. We show that the former e¤ect domi-
nates under quite general assumptions. Our results thus contrast with the
well known result from tournament theory saying that performance su¤ers
from heterogeneity. In existing theory, more heterogeneity never increases
e¤ort. If ability-level is common knowledge, then the principal can perfectly
compensate more heterogeneity with higher prize spread, making equilib-
rium e¤ort una¤ected by ability di¤erence, while if not, heterogeneity weak-
ens the agentsmarginal return from e¤ort. In our setting, heterogeneity is
in fact good for e¤ort since it increases prize spread more than just to com-
pensate for higher heterogeneity. This result is robust to a setting where the
agents do not know their ability-level. If there is a probability  < 1 that
an agent has high ability, it would only imply that the high ability agent
calculates a probability (1   ) that she runs against a weaker contestant.
The higher , the higher is the threshold heterogeneity and the lower is the
threshold uncertainty for when the high ability agent will choose max prize
spread.
We also see that emax (and hence both e¤orts) is rst increasing in ;
and then decreasing. Hence, the optimal uncertainty-level is strictly positive.
This is in contrast to standard tournaments where e¤ort su¤ers from more
uncertainty, or at best is una¤ected by the uncertainty-level if the principal
can perfectly compensate noise with higher prize spread. The result com-
plements Krakel and Sliwka (2004), who nd that more noise may increase
e¤ort in a setting where agents can choose risk levels. Finally, observe that
e¤ort is increasing in R, so if the principal can control prize pool but not
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prize spread, then one should expect a higher pool, R, the less heterogenous
the agents are.
We have focused on the agentsoptimal choices, and have not deduced
a specic bargaining solution between the agents. But if we stick to the
restriction that w1  w2,8 then in any bargaining game over the prize spread
between agent i and agent j (prior to e¤ort decisions), comparative statics
on the optimal choice for agent i weakly holds for the bargaining solution,
since optimal spread for agent j is zero. Hence, we can make the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 1 In any bargaining game over the prize spread between agent
i and agent j, we have (i) equilibrium prize spread weakly decreases in noise
(), (ii) equilibrium prize spread weakly increases in ability di¤erence kj ki
(iii) equilibrium e¤ort weakly increases in ability di¤erence kj   ki.
In the following we will report on an experiment testing this conjecture.
3 Experimental design
The experimental design reects our aim to investigate conjecture 1. We
conducted a real e¤ort experiment in order to make the ability-di¤erence
between the subjects natural rather than imposed. We also believe that real
e¤ort makes the meaning of noise, or luck, clearer to the subjects.
The work task for the subjects participating in the experiment consisted
of doing head calculations; multiplying one- and two-digit numbers (e.g. 7
x 83).9 The task nicely mimics real world work tasks and also ensures het-
erogeneity in productivity. Doing head calculations is shown to be rather
insensitive to learning and is therefore well-suited for experimentation. A
problem with real e¤ort tasks in experiments is the potential for excessive
intrinsic motivation, blurring the e¤ect of monetary incentives. We therefore
wanted to make the work task boring enough to be a¤ected by monetary in-
centives. As we shall see, monetary incentives indeed a¤ected performance,
and the lack of intrinsic motivation was to some extent conrmed by the
8w1  w2 is a weak restriction. We did not make this restriction in our experiment,
but no one ever proposed w2 > w1:
9The actual assignments were borrowed from Thomas Dohmen and Armin Falk who
used them in Dohmen and Falk (2006).
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subjects"moaning and groaning" when they learned that the experiment
consisted of doing head calculations. 10
Altogether 108 undergraduate students from the University of Stavanger
were recruited by E-mail to participate in the experiment. They were told
that they had the opportunity to participate in an economic experiment
and if they did well they could earn a nice sum of money. The experiment
was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). The instructions were given
both verbally and on the computer screen. The subjects were told that no
form of communication was allowed throughout the experimentand and that
all results were to be held anonymous. We had 18 subjects in each out of six
sessions. Each session lasted for about 50 minutes. Total average earnings
in the experiment were NOK 302 (38 Euro).
The subjects went through ve steps. Subjects were informed that they
would go through several steps, but they did not know what these steps
would involve, i.e. when they were informed about step 1, they did not
know what would happen in step 2 and so on.
Step 1, risk preferences: In step 1 we applied a method for eliciting risk
preferences similar to Dohmen and Falks (2006) , which is a simple version of
Holt and Laury (2002). Upon arrival the subjects were seated at a computer
lot and given a table with 12 rows. For each row the subject where asked
to decide whether they pre¤ered a lottery or a safe alternativ. The lottery
was a fty-fty probability of NOK 200 or zero, and was the same for all
rows. The safe alternative was NOK 15 in row one, increasing with NOK
15 for each row. By examining the shifting point from the lottery to the
safe option, we get information on the subjects risk attitudes. With the
chosen value of the safe option, a risk neutral participant with monotonous
risk preferences would choose the lottery for the six rst situations and then
switch to the safe option for the remaining situations.11
Step 2, ability revelation: In step 2 of the experiment, subjects revealed
their ability levels by multiplying one- and two-digit numbers for a period
of ve minutes. They were paid by a piece rate scheme giving NOK 5 per
10Also Dohmen and Falk (2006), who used exactly the same work task, found that
monetary incentives signicantly a¤ected performance.
11For two reasons, we do not test for reference-dependent risk preferences (see Koszegi
and Rabin, 2007, for a general treatment). First, the tournament literature, which our
model is deduced from, does assume expected utitity maximizing agents with reference
independent preferences. Second, in our experiment the reference is approximately the
same in the lottery choice and in the tournament.
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correct answer. The problems were given on the computer screen and the
subject typed the answer to the problem using the keyboard. A message
appeared on the screen telling the subject wheter the answer was correct
or not. After the ve minute work period they received either the grade A,
B or C, depending on how well they did compared to the others, and they
were told that 1/3 received grade A, 1/3 grade B, and 1/3 grade C.
Step 3, bargaining: In step 3, subjects were told that they in the next
step were going to compete against another subject in doing similar kinds
of head calculations for ve minutes. The subjects were then asked to split
NOK 200 by deciding a winner prize and a loser prize (w1; w2) prior to
this competition. Subjects were randomly picked to either propose prizes
(proposer) or choose to accept or reject prize proposals (responder). Ac-
cept yielded the proposed solution, but if an o¤er was rejected, then prizes
were set to (150,0).12 We imposed uncertainty by telling the subjects that
a random variable, called a bonus, would be drawn after the competition
(tournament) and added to the subjectsnumber of correct answers. We
imposed two levels of uncertainty: the random bonus either had uniform
distribution between  3 and 3 ("low uncertainty"), or uniform distribution
between  10 and 10 ("high uncertainty"). Ability-levels (for proposer and
responder) and the uncertainty-level were common knowledge when they
bargained.
Each subject participated in four rounds of bargaining, where they met
new opponents each round. They were told that one out of the four rounds
would be picked at random to determine the prizes for the oncoming tour-
nament. There were two bargaining rounds where subjects where told that
the random bonus was distributed between  3 and 3, and two rounds where
they were told that the bonus was distributed between  10 and 10. After
each round of bargaining, subjects were informed about the outcome of the
bargaining.
Step 4, tournament. Subjects went through a new ve-minute work
period multiplying one- and two-digit numbers. They knew the grade of
their opponent (as well as their own), the size of the prizes and level of
uncertainty. The sequence of problems were the same for all subjects and in
case of a tie, randomization determined the winner. After the work period,
12The rejection prizes reect the cost of barganing break down (lower total surplus),
and the idea that a principal in general would like a higher prize spread than the agents.
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winners and losers were revealed together with the number of correct answers
and the random individual bonus (luck component).
Step 5, questionnaire. We gathered questionnaire data on gender, age
and personality. Personality was measured by the Big-Five scale used by
psychologists, which measures the degree of Openness, Conscientiousness,
Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism.13
4 Hypothesis
Assume that the subjects believe their ability assignment. In equilibrium,
the responder then accepts the proposers o¤er in the bargaining game out-
lined above. In games where the best subject proposes (A to B, A to C
or B to C), she has all the bargaining power since the low ability subject
has nothing to earn from rejecting the o¤er. In games where the low-ability
subject proposes (B to A, C to A or C to B), the high-ability subject has
some bargaining power, since she can gain from refusing an o¤er with su¢ -
ciently low prize spread. The low-ability subject will o¤er the lowest prize
spread that the high-ability subject is expected to accept. Hence, the quali-
tative comparative statics results on the optimal spread for the high-ability
agent applies for the bargaining solution also when the low ability subject
proposes. The model thus predicts the following outcomes from our experi-
ment:
H1: Among heterogenous pairs, prize spread is higher when the random
bonus has distribution U( 3; 3), than when it has distribution U( 10; 10).
H2: Prize spread increases with ability-di¤erence.
H3: E¤ort increases with ability-di¤erence.
E¤ort in our model equals number of correct answers, while output is
number of correct answers plus the randomly chosen bonus.
5 Results and analysis
In this section we present the main results. Table 1 displays summary sta-
tistics on prize spread by pair composition and level of uncertainty.
13The Big-Five questionnaire measures personality traits by asking subjects how they
assess themselves. We used a 20 item version of the questionnaire. The subjects indicate
their assesments on a seven-point scale for each item.
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AC AB BC Homogeneous Heterogeneous pairs All pairs
Average prize spread 121.9 98.3 105.7 55,0 108.6 99.7
low uncertainty (33.9) (48.1) (34.5) (39.5) (40.2) (44.6)
Average prize spread 102.3 93.7 97.7 62.2 97.9 91.9
high uncertainty (39.9) (53.5) (48.4) (64.2) (47.2) (51.8)
Average prize spread 112.1 96 101.7 58.6 103.3 95.8
total (38.0) (50.5) (41.9) (52.5) (44.0) (48.4)
Observations
(low/high/total) 30/30/60 30/30/60 30/30/60 18/18/36 180 216
An "AB" pair consists of a subject graded A who is bargaining against a
subject graded B. A bargaining solution from an AB pair is either the out-
come from an As o¤er to a B, or a Bs o¤er to an A. The same goes for "AC"
pairs and "BC" pairs. "Homogeneous" pairs consist of bargaining solutions
from A vs. A, B vs. B or C vs. C. "Low" refers to random bonus distribution
U( 3; 3), while "High" refers to random bonus distribution U( 10; 10).
Two tendencies are shown in Table 1: First, we observe that prize spread
decreases with uncertainty-level. Except for the homogenous pairs, prize
spread is lower under high uncertainty than under low uncertainty. This
supports H1. Second, we see that prize spread increases quite strongly with
ability-di¤erence. It is lowest for the homogeneous pairs and highest for the
AC pairs. This also corresponds with the prediction of the model and seems
to support H2 above.
Let us examine H1 more closely. First, we report on a t-test of H1,
dropping homogenous pairs from the sample (since H1 does not apply for
homogenous pairs). We test the hypothesis that prize spread is the same
under both low- and high uncertainty against the one-tailed alternative that
prize spread is higher under low uncertainty than under high uncertainty. A
two sample t-test14 makes us reject the null-hypothesis of equal prize spread;
prize spread is signicantly higher under low uncertainty (t(178) = 1:65,
p = 0:05, one-tailed). When we run a regression, controlling for risk aver-
sion, pair composition (heterogeneity) and gender, we get the same picture15,
see Table 2. The coe¢ cient on uncertainty-level ("high") is statistically sig-
nicant within a 90 % condence interval (p = 0:09). Controlling for risk
14Since the two samples have unequal variances we use Welchst-test.
15The Breusch-Pagan test cannot reject heteroskedasticity, requiring us to make a robust
regression.
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preferences, pair composition and gender, the regression shows a decrease
in prize spread of NOK 11.0 when going from low uncertainty to high un-
certainty. Importantly, we see that risk preferences cannot explain prize
spread. It can also be shown that interaction variables on risk preferences
and uncertainty-level are highly insignicant. This may seem surprising,
but the majority of subjects are risk neutral or close to risk neutral over the
relatively low stakes o¤ered here. We thus establish our rst main result
from the experiment:
Result 1 Controlling for risk preferences, prize spread is higher under
low uncertainty than under high uncertainty.
Result 1 supports H1. Note also that the result indicates that e¤ort is
costly in our experiment. Recall that there are two e¤ects of more noise on
agent is optimal choice: It decreases the probability of winning cet. par.
so agent i might want to decrease prize spread in order to save on e¤ort
costs, or she can eliminate the reduced winner probability by increasing the
prize spread, since higher prize spread increases the e¤ort-di¤erence between
the agents. The experiment indicates that the former e¤ect dominates,
suggesting substantial e¤ort costs.
An alternative explanation for result 1 is that subjects have some kind of
fairness concerns: High prize spread is OK if e¤ort is important, but not if
luck is important (see Cappelen et al., 2007, for an interesting experiment on
the relationship between e¤ort and distributive justice). In our experimental
setting, we cannot make certain conclusions whether or not these e¤ects
exist. One would, however, expect that if fairness concerns play a role, then
gender and/or personality have an impact on prize spread per se, and on the
relationship between prize spread and uncertainty. Several studies show that
social preferences are stronger among women (see Croson and Gneezy, 2004,
for a survey), and concerns for distributive justice16 have been shown to
be correlated with personality traits derived from the Big-Five personality
test (see Skarlicki et al. 1999). However, we nd no signicant e¤ects
from personality and gender, indicating that neither gender nor fairness
concerns drive result 1. We tested for a number of interaction variables.
Only one of these turned out signicant: A decrease in prize spread from
16Concerns for distributive justice are in the psychology literature measured by indi-
vidual di¤erences in reward allocation decisions, and individual di¤erences in reaction to
inequity, see Major and Deaux (1982) for an early review.
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higher uncertainty is signicant among pairs where women are present, while
there is no e¤ect in pairs with only men. However, the e¤ect was larger in
pairs with one man and one woman than in pairs with only women, making
it tendentious to conclude that gender a¤ects the relationship between prize
spread and uncertainty.
Let us now consider H2: Prize spread increases with ability-di¤erence.
Table 2 indicates that there is a positive relationship between prize spread
and ability-di¤erence among heterogenous pairs, but since the corollary also
applies when kj is reduced from kj = ki to kj < ki, we must also include the
homogenous pairs in the sample. We rst report on t-tests on the relation-
ship between prize spread and each pair composition. Let s(h), h = AC;
AB;CB;HOMO denote prize spread as a function of ability-di¤erence. The
tests support that s(AC) > s(AB) = s(BC) > s(HOMO): From Table 3,
we see that all tests are signicant within a 90 % condence interval except
for s(BC) vs. s(AB), as predicted. We can thus state
Result 2 Prize spread increases with ability-di¤erence.
Result 2 supports H2.17 As predicted by the model, Result 2 should
also imply that e¤ort increases with ability-di¤erence. This leads us to
H3. Table 4 displays a robust regression where e¤ort, i.e. number of right
answers (random bonus excluded) is the dependent variable. We see that
prize spread has a signicantly positive e¤ect on e¤ort (p = 0:017).18 For
a NOK 1 increase in prize spread, the number of correct answers increases
with 0:034: This may seem like a small e¤ect, but it means that an increase
from zero prize spread to max prize spread of NOK 200 increases the number
of correct answers with 6:8. We thus have
Result 3 E¤ort increases with prize spread.
Results 2 and 3 support H3: Higher ability-di¤erence increases prize
spread, which in turn increases e¤ort. But note from Table 4 that when we
control for prize spread, ability-di¤erence has a negative e¤ect on e¤ort. This
ts with other ndings in the literature (starting with Bull et al.,1987) and
17 It can be shown that Results 1 and 2 hold when we control for who is proposer and
who is responder. In particular, we nd the same results when we examine the high-ability
subjectsproposals.
18Although there is a positive relationship between dependent variables in this regression
(ability-di¤erence and prize spread), we do not have an endogeneity problem since prize
spread and ability-di¤erence are not determined simultaneously. Moreover, tests shows
that the level of multicolinarity is su¢ ciently limited, allowing us to use the robust OLS-
regression presented here.
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supports our model. From the IC constraints, we see that for a given prize
spread, e¤ort decreases with ability-di¤erence. This result is well known and
traces back to Lazear and Rosen (1981).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze and experimentally test a tournament model where
heterogenous agents determine prize spread. We nd some results particu-
larly interesting. First, our corner solutions elucidate empirical puzzles on
rm characteristics and wage structure, since marginal di¤erences in hetero-
geneity, uncertainty and size of the prize pool can signicantly impact on
prize spread.
Second, our theoretical result on the positive relationship between het-
erogeneity and prize spread, supported by the experiment, challenges the
idea that heterogenous agents should not participate in the same contest.
Higher ability-di¤erence triggers higher prize spread, resulting in higher ef-
fort.
Third, our model shows that if agents set prize spread in an asym-
metric tournament, then we can expect a negative relationship between
noise/uncertainty and prize spread. This result is supported experimentally
and has important empirical implications. It suggests that the relationship
between wage structure and uncertainty in an industry is a¤ected by em-
ployee power, such as the degree of unionization. Moreover, it implies that
an observed negative relationship between prize spread and uncertainty does
not have to be explained by risk aversion or fairness concerns.
As noted in the introduction, several wage-setting regimes have the fea-
ture of being tournaments where the contestants themselves set prizes, and
it is thus important to understand these tournaments. Our paper is just a
small contribution as compared to what should be investigated. Future the-
oretical research should explore sorting, risk aversion, and social preferences
within the setting presented here. The constraint on the total prize should
also be relaxed, and richer bargaining environments that include bargaining
between agents and principal should be investigated. Future experimental
work should not only include real-e¤ort experiments, since some control is
lost when we do not know the agentscost functions.
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Appendix
Proof of (7)
From the IC constraint (R  2w2)g(e) = C 0j(ej) we have
(R  2w2)g0(e) @e
@ej
@ej
@w2
  C 00j (ej)
@ej
@w2
= 2g(e)
Substituting from this and the IC constraint in (6) we then get
W 0(w2) = 1  2G(e)  (R  2w2)g(e) 2g(e)
(R  2w2)g0(e) @e@ej   C 00j (ej)
= 1  2G(e)  2g(e)
g0(e)
g(e)
@e
@ej
  C
00
j (ej)
C0j(ej)
The last expression coincides with the one in (7), and hence proves the
formula.
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider
F (d)  1 2 (d) K 2(d)d
0(d)
(d) d  (n  1)
= 1 2 (d)+2K (d)
2d
 0(d)d+ (n  1)(d)
We have
F 0(d) =  2(d)+2K (2(d)d+(d)
2)( 0(d)d+(n 1)(d)) (d)2d( 00(d)d 0(d)+(n 1)0(d))
( 0(d)d+(n 1)(d))2
and so
F 0(0) = 2(0)

 1 +K (n  1)(0)
2
((n  1)(0))2

= 2(0)

 1 +K 1
(n  1)

Hence F 0(0) > 0 i¤ K > n   1. For K > n   1, i.e. low heterogeneity
(kjki <

n
n 1
n 1
), we then have by continuity F (d) > 0 for 0 < d < d1,
some d1 > 0.
Let emax be the e¤ort spread corresponding to w2 = 0; it is from the IC
constraint and (8)-(9) given by
Rg(emax) = nkj(Kemax)
n 1  k(emax)n 1 (13)
where k = nkj(K)n 1 is dened by the identity. Since g(e) = ( e )
1
 we
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then have emax = dm, where dm is given by
(R=n)(dm) = k(dm)
n 1, (dm = emax=) (14)
We see that dm ! 0 as R=n ! 0, hence there is r1 > 0 such that
dm < d1 for R=n < r1. It thus follows that for R=n < r1 we have
F (d) > 0 for 0 < d < dm, and hence W 0(w2) > 0 for 0 < w2 < R=2. The
minimal spread w2 = R=2 (and e = 0) is thus optimal here.
By a similar reasoning we can also show that for small R and/or large  it
is optimal to induce maximal e¤ort spread when the degree of heterogeneity
is large. Consider high heterogeneity: K < n  1. We then have F 0(0) < 0
and hence F (d) < 0 for 0 < d < d2, some d2 > 0. From (14) we now see that
there is r2 > 0 such that dm < d2 for R=n < r2. For R=n < r2 we thus
have F (d) < 0 for 0 < d < dm, and hence W 0(w2) < 0 for 0 < w2 < R=2.
The maximal spread w2 = 0 (and e = emax) is thus optimal here. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider
F (d;K)  1  2 (d) K 2(d)d
0(d)
(d) d  (n  1)
; 0  d  d
where  ( d) = 1. We show below that for normally or uniformly distrib-
uted noise terms the following conditions are satised:
(c1) F (d;K) < 0 for all d 2 (0; d) when K  n  1
(c2) F (d;K) ? 0 as d 7 d0, d 2 (0; d), when K > n  1
(c3) 0(d) < 0 for d 2 (0; d), and (d)d! 0 as d! d.
Let D be the class of distributions that satisfy (c1-c3).
(i) Consider rst low heterogeneity; K > n  1.
Let dm = dm(R=n) be dened as in the proof of Proposition 1, see (14).
We see that d0m() > 0 and dm ! d as R=n ! 1, and hence that there is
r0 > 0 such that dm 7 d0 as R=n 7 r0, where d0 is the root dened in
(c2). For R=n < r0 we thus have F (d;K) > 0 all d 2 (0; dm) and therefore
W 0(w2) > 0 all w2 2 (0; R=2). This implies that w2 = R=2 (and thus e = 0)
is optimal for R=n < r0. The optimal value is then W (R=2) = R=2.
For R=n > r0 we have dm > d0 and hence F (d;K) ? 0 as d 7 d0, d 2
(0; dm). There is thus w20 such thatW 0(w2) ? 0 as w2 ? w20, w2 2 (0; R=2).
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Hence either w2 = R=2 (e = 0) or w2 = 0 (e = emax) is then optimal.
For w2 = 0 the value is
W0 = G(eim   ejm)R  Ci(eim)
where eim; ejm are the agentsrespective e¤orts when w2 = 0, and thus
eim   ejm = emax. Consider now how the value W0 varies with R. Since
e¤orts depend on prizes via R   2w2, we will have @elm@R =  12 @el@w2 . By the
same reasoning that led from (6) to (10) and (12) we then obtain
@
@R
W0 = G(eim   ejm) + g(eim   ejm)

@eim
@R
  @ejm
@R

R  C 0i(eim)
@eim
@R
=  1
2

F^ (em)  1

, em = e(0) = emax
=  1
2
(F (dm)  1) , dm = em

Comparing the values corresponding to w2 = R=2 and w2 = 0 we thus have
@
@R(W (R=2) W0) = 12   @@RW0 = 12 + 12 (F (dm)  1) = 12F (dm)
From the properties of F (dm) it then follows that the value di¤erence is
increasing for R < r0n (where dm < d0) and decreasing for R > r0n. If
the di¤erence is negative for R su¢ ciently large, it then follows that there
is R1 > 0 such that W (R=2) ?W0 as R 7 R1.
Consider
W0 = G(eim   ejm)R  Ci(eim) = G(em)R Ki(em)n
=  (dm)R Ki(dm)nn,
whereKi = ki

1  ( kikj )
1
n 1
 n
, and dm = em is determined by (dm)(R=
n) =
kdn 1m . So we have
W0
W (R=2)
= 2

 (dm)  Ki(dm)
n
(R=n)

= 2

 (dm)  Ki(dm)
n
kdn 1m =(dm)

= 2

 (dm)  Ki
k
(dm)dm

whereKik =
1
n

1  ( kikj )
1
n 1
 1
. Since dm ! d and thus (dm)dm ! 0 as
R!1, we see that W0 > W (R=2) for R su¢ ciently large. Since moreover
dm and hence the ratio W0W (R=2) depends on R and  via R=
n, we see that
there is indeed r1 > 0 such that W0 > W (R=2) i¤ R=n > r1. This proves
statement (i) in the proposition.
(ii) Consider next high heterogeneity; K < n  1.
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It follows from property (c1) that we then have F (d;K) < 0 for all
d 2 (0; d), and therefore W 0(w2) < 0 for all w2 2 (0; R=2), for any (feasible)
R > 0. Hence w2 = 0 is always optimal in this case. This proves statement
(ii).
Finally, consider statement (iii).
We have emax = dm(R=n), where d0m() > 0, and hence
@
@emax = dm(R=
n)+d0m(R=n)( nR n 1) = dm(R=n) n(R=n)d0m(R=n)
Dening r = R=n we have dm given by (dm)r = kdn 1m and hence
(dm) + r
0(dm)d0m = k(n  1)dn 2m d0m, i.e.
d0m =
(dm)
k(n 1)dn 2m  r0(dm) =
(dm)
r(dm)(n 1)d 1m  r0(dm) > 0
(The inequality follows from 0 < 0.) Hence
@
@emax = dm   nrd0m = dm   nr (dm)r(dm)(n 1)d 1m  r0(dm)
= dm
h
1  n(dm)(dm)(n 1) 0(dm)dm
i
For  ! 0 we have r !1 and dm ! d, hence
 
@
@emax

=dm ! [1  0] >
0
For  ! 1 we have r ! 0 and dm ! 0, hence
 
@
@emax

=dm !h
1  n(0)(0)(n 1)+0
i
< 0.
This proves statement (iii).
It remains to show that uniformly or normally distributed noise yields
distributions that satisfy (c1 - c3).
Consider rst the uniform case: "l  U [0; 1] (so zl  U [a; a+ ]). Here
we have  (d) = Pr("j   "i < d) = 1   12(1   d)2 for 0  d  1, and thus
(d) = 1  d. From (12) we then have
F (d) = 1  2  1  12(1  d)2 K 2(1 d)d 1
(1 d)d (n 1)
=  1 + (1  d)2 +K 2(1 d)2dd+(n 1)(1 d)
This yields
F 0(d) = 2(1  d)K[ 2d(d+(n 1)(1 d))+(1 d)(n 1)] (d+(n 1)(1 d))2
[d+(n 1)(1 d)]2
 2(1  d) f(d;K)
[d+(n 1)(1 d)]2
Note that the sign of F 0(d) is determined by the 2nd-order polynomial
f(d;K). We have
f(0;K) = (n  1) ( n+ 1 +K), f(1;K) =  2K   1 < 0,
f 00(d;K) = 2 (n  2) (2  n+ 2K)
For K  n   1 we have f(0;K) < 0 and f(1;K) < 0. Suppose there
is d 2 (0; 1) such that f(d;K)  0. Then the term multiplying K in the
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denition of f() must be positive, and hence
f(d;K)  f(d; n  1) = d  (n  2)nd+ 1  n2
But the last parenthesis is smaller than
 
(n  2)n+ 1  n2 = 1  2n <
0, hence we have a contradiction. Thus f(d) < 0 and hence F 0(d) < 0 for
all d 2 (0; 1), thus condition (c1) holds.
For K > n   1 we have f(0;K) > 0, f(1;K) < 0 and f 00(d;K) > 0,
hence f(d;K) ? 0 as d 7 d1 for some d1 2 (0; 1), and the same is then true
for F 0(d). Since F (1) < 0, it is thus the case that F (d) = 0 has a unique
root for d 2 (0; 1), and hence that condition (c2) holds.
Consider nally normally distributed noise. As a normalization suppose
"i   "j  N(0; 1), and let () and () be the corresponding density and
CDF, respectively. Note that we have 0(d) =  d(d), and thus from (12)
F (d;K)  1  2(d) K 2(d)d0(d)
(d)
d (n 1)
= 1  2(d) + 2K (d)d
d2+(n 1)
This yields
F 0(d;K) =  2(d) + 2K ((d)+
0(d)d)[d2+(n 1)] (d)d2d
[d2+(n 1)]2
= 2(d)

 1 +K (1 d
2)[d2+(n 1)] 2d2
[d2+(n 1)]2

Consider rst K  n   1. Suppose F 0(d;K)  0 for some d > 0. Then
the term multiplying K must be positive and hence
F 0(d;K)  F 0(d; n  1) = 2(d)
h
 d2 n 2+d2n+n2
(d2+n 1)2
i
This yields a contradiction, hence F 0(d;K) < 0 for all d > 0 when
K  n  1. This shows that (c1) holds.
Consider next K > n   1. Let y = d2, and note that F 0(d;K) has the
same sign as the 2nd-order polynomial
f(y;K) =   (y + (n  1))2 +K ((1  y) (y + (n  1))  2y)
We have here
f(0;K) > 0, f(1;K) < 0, f 00(y;K) =  2K   2 < 0
Hence there is y1 2 (0; 1) such that f(y;K) ? 0 as y 7 y1, and conse-
quently F 0(d;K) ? 0 as d 7 d1 for some d1 > 0. Since F (d;K) !  1 as
d!1, we then see that (c2) holds.
This completes the proof.
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Tables and gures
Table 2: Prize spread and uncertainty
Dependent variable: Prize spread
High -10.976*
(p=0.093)
AB -15.780*
(p=0.053)
BC -10.935
(p=0.139)
Male 11.113
(p=0.326)
Averse -3.364
(p=0.682)
Love -5.552
(p=0.501)
Non-monotonic -8.891
(p=0.200)
Constant 119.826***
(p<0.000)
R-squared  0.052
Sample size  180
Notes:  Robust OLS estimates. Level of significance: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01. Homogenoues pairs not
included."High" is the uncertainty dummy, which is equal to one if uncertainty is high and zero if uncertainty is low.
"Male" is the gender dummy, which equals one if the pair consists solely of men and zero if a woman is a part of a pair.
The reference group for pair composition is AC pairs. The dummy "AB" equals one if the pair is an AB pair and zero
otherwise. The same goes for the "BC" dummy. For risk preferences we use the lottery choices elicited in step 1 of the
experiment, and categorize pairs in four different risk categories. As in Dohmen and Falk (2006) there were some
subjects that did not have a unique switching point, making us have a "non-monotonic" dummy. The "averse" dummy is
equal to one if the pair is risk averse and zero if not, and "love" equals one if a pair is risk loving, and zero otherwise.
Risk neutral pairs are the reference group. In risk averse pairs at least one is risk averse and no-one is risk loving. In risk
loving pairs at least one is risk loving and no-one is risk averse, while in risk neutral pairs both are risk neutral, or one is
risk loving while the other is risk averse.
Table 3: Prize spread and ability-difference
Welch`s
Prize spread t-test
AC versus AB p =.03
AC versus BC p =.08
BC versus AB p =.51
AC versus HOMO p <0.001
AB versus HOMO p <0.001
BC versus HOMO p <0.001
Notes :  The t-tests are one-sided except for BC
versus AB witch is a two-sided test.
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Table 4: Effort and ability-difference
Dependent variable:
Effort Coef.
Prize spread 0.034**
(p=0.017)
AC -5.267**
(p=0.022)
AB -1.458
(p=0.528)
BC -3.206
(p=0.104)
A 9.186***
(p<0.001)
C -6.141***
(p<0.001)
Constant 10.981***
R-squared 0.510
Sample size 108
Notes: Robust OLS estimates.  Level of significance: *=0.10, **=0.05, ***=0.01.
Here the data are on individuals, not pairs, making the dummies AB, AC and BC
equal one if the subject was part of the relevant pair. The reference group consists of
subjects that were part of homogeneous pairs. The dummies A and C are ability-
levels, with B as reference group.
Table 5: Effort data
Effort piece rate
Ability level: A B C
Mean effort: 21,4 9,5 3,2
Std. Dev 4,76 3,38 1,62
Median 20,5 9,5 3
Min 16 4 1
Max 33 17 6
# Obs 36 36 36
Effort tournament
Ability level: A B C
Mean effort: 20,4 12,6 4,6
Std.Dev 9,71 6,34 3,1
Median 19,5 13 4
Min 5 1 1
Max 38 25 12
# obs 36 36 36
Effort means number of right answers in a 5 minute work period
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